I Introduction
New Zealand has had a long history of promoting and protecting the rights of women. The first country with suffrage for women, and the first to have the highest governing offices simultaneously filled by women. 1 These achievements are embedded in the national memory and New Zealand views itself as world leader in the area of women's rights. 2 However, these instances do not represent a complete victory over gender discrimination.
Amongst others, pay disparity remains a live issue today. The gender pay gap in New
Zealand has remained around 10 per cent for the last five years. 3 Disparity in pay is the result of many complex, and often intertwined, factors. Social structure, equality of opportunity and discrimination all contribute to the gap. 4 Under New Zealand legislation pay equality is expressly protected in the Equal Pay Act 1972 (the Act). There must be equal pay for equal work. 5 However, disparity can still exist where there is equality. In 2014, the Court of Appeal considered if pay equity was also protected under the Act. 6 Equity requires equal pay for work of equal value. The Court found that pay equity fitted within the scope of the Act. 7 The Court also gave general direction towards the criteria to be applied when assessing a potentially discriminatory rate of remuneration.
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In this paper I analyse and critique that decision. I seek to answer two fundamental questions about the case and wider issues surrounding pay equity. First, I ask whether a mandate does exist under the Act requiring the provision of pay equity. Is the Act restricted to a narrow pay equality interpretation, or is it wide enough to encapsulate pay equity? This question is answered by embarking on an exercise in statutory interpretation.
The generally accepted method of statutory interpretation is identified and analysed against the process of the Court of Appeal. The conclusion will be reached that little light is shed on the position of pay equity from an interpretation of the statute. Both the inclusion and exclusion of pay equity remain open interpretations. A realist explanation will show a policy decision, in the absence of an interpretative answer, is driving factor of the Court of Appeal's findings.
The second question looks to the natural continuation of the current case and asks what avenue should be now used to pursue pay equity. This is a normative inquiry. Both the ability and appropriateness of the courts to provide for pay equity will be questioned.
Litigation will be considered under both a traditional and strategic approach. The alternate solutions of a legislative response and an unregulated market will also be investigated. It will be argued that judicial inclusion of pay equity under the Equal Pay Act is undesirable.
Instead, dedicated legislation would prove the most effective means of achieving pay equity.
II Basis of the Claim and Procedural History Terranova v Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota is the most recent decision in a line of cases beginning with a claim lodged with the Employment Relations
Authority. 9 This claim was brought by Ms Kristine Bartlett, an aged-care worker. Her claim is that her employer, Terranova, is not providing her a rate of pay consistent with the requirements under the Equal Pay Act. She argues that the entire aged-care sector is paid less because it is dominated by women.
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The Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota, of which Ms Bartlett is a member, brought a similar claim seeking a general statement from the Employment Court about the general principles involved in implementing equal pay. 
III Interpretation of the Equal Pay Act 1972
While the public interest in this case lies with its treatment of pay equity, the Court's decision is essentially an exercise in statutory interpretation. The interpretation of the statute is the determinative factor in the progression of the claim. How the Court approached the exercise is therefore vital in any analysis of the case. This analysis must be grounded in an understanding of the nature and accepted methodology of statutory interpretation. The Court of Appeal's approach can then be compared and analysed against this yardstick.
Statutory interpretation is far from being devoid of contention. There is debate surrounding the scope, nature and theoretical underpinning of the task set for the courts. 15 However, messiness and multiplicity in method is not a unique phenomenon within the law. 16 The experience of law, in common law jurisdictions, is not that of a code rigidly applied exclusively by women would have, out of necessity, been placed in its own paragraph. Pay equality is not possible when no men do the same work. Therefore, the Court acknowledged the inclusion of work largely performed by women, with that which is exclusive to women, gives an indication something more than equality is intended in paragraph (b).
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The Court of Appeal also noted that the drafting is of a poor standard. 38 It is ambiguous and uses circular reasoning at times. The Court relied upon this lack of precision to defeat arguments that the use of definite articles confined the Act to comparisons of the same work. 39 However, the Court did not question the standard of drafting relating to the construction of s 3. The aforementioned textual indications in favour of a wider meaning
were not subject to the same scepticism of drafting. By undercutting the quality of the drafting in certain areas it seems to weaken the strength of any textual arguments made.
A textual argument, in favour of a wide reading, remains. This was not considered or identified by the Court. This regards the criteria in paragraphs (a) and (b These indications go beyond those identified by the Court. However, the limitations of these signals must be recognised. There is nothing explicit and they must be weighted accordingly.
Purpose and context
The Court of Appeal then sought to uncover the legislative purpose. 41 The purpose is the reason for the enactment of the Equal Pay Act. Deducing this purpose has the potential to resolve the ambiguity by colouring the statutory language. Several different materials were used in an attempt to draw out the legislation's purpose. These were parliamentary debates, commissioned reports and subsequent legislation.
While the purposive approach has taken its place in the generally accepted principles of statutory interpretation, there are aspects of ascertaining purpose that remain in a more tenuous position. 42 The main debate surrounds the idea of parliamentary intent. Within the report passages were identified at times supporting, and at other times rejecting, the inclusion of pay equity. This lack of consistency was the reason given for not engaging with the report more deeply.
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Inconsistent and ambiguous is a fair representation of the report. It is clear that the report advocated for pay equality but its intent towards pay equity is not so apparent. Equal pay is defined but not in a way that explicitly rules pay equity in or out. 57 The Commission accepted that gender discrimination manifests in both pay inequality and inequity and acknowledged the premise of equal pay for work of equal value. 58 However, acknowledging the problem exists does not mean the report recommended action to be taken. There is no explicit statement that pay equity should be addressed in any subsequent legislation. The Commission rejected the implementation of a universal job evaluation tool that assesses work on an objective basis. 59 This type of assessment is commonly, though not exclusively, used in pay equity investigations. 60 Therefore, the report does not clarify the purpose of the Act. The same substantive conclusion as the Court is reached. Westminster system, Parliament is giving the role of legislating. The formulation of policy is the purview of the Executive. However, in this constitutional set up the government holds a majority in the House of Representatives. 63 The government, along with its coalition partners or allies, therefore has the potential to give effect to its policies directly.
The input of the parliamentary process, particularly Select Committee, must not be overlooked. However, the department policy can remain a key driver in the enactment of legislation. It can be a rich source for illuminating the purpose of the legislation. The argument is that it can be artificial in certain cases to refer only to parliamentary intent.
Where executive policy has been driven through the House it may be useful to recognise the departmental purpose. there is a general consensus that something more is needed for pay equity to be remedied. 71 The reports work on the assumption that further legislative intervention is necessary.
The orthodox position is that occurrences after the passage of an Act do not affect its meaning. 72 This includes the formation of a generally held working understanding of how the Act operated. As has been argued, an exception to the orthodoxy should exist where government practice and working knowledge has been built upon a particular understanding. This is particularly desirable where ambiguity persists. The working understanding of the Act which has been generally accepted for four decades, evidenced by the enactment of the 1990 Act, should be given weight. The current proceedings are the biggest challenge designed to test that working assumption. requirements. However, the limits of this argument need to be acknowledged. There is little evidence to link the Act with ratification.
The findings on interpretation
The Court decided on balance that the textual, purposive, contextual and value factors weighed in favour of the Act providing for pay equity. 80 The Court did acknowledge this was a finely weighted decision. While statutory interpretation is not the focus of this paper, the application of the accepted approach to interpretation has identified some inadequacies within the orthodoxy. In particular the debate surrounding parliamentary intention remains an active source of discussion. occurrences are ways in which the orthodox approach could be strengthened. However, this has not impeded the ability of the courts to adopt a purposive approach. Using the language of 'purpose' as opposed to 'parliamentary intent' has insulated the debate to some degree. Purpose is simply stated as what Parliament was trying to achieve.
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IV Continuing the Path to Equity
The Court of Appeal's decision has made it possible to litigate pay equity claims under the Equal Pay Act. There are two ways litigation could be used to achieve pay equity. the most effective in reaching the desired outcome. I will argue that a legislative response would be the most desirable progression in achieving pay equity.
A Litigation
As established there are two ways litigation could be used to achieve a solution favourable to pay equity. First, litigation could be used to create precedent for future claims. In this way the judicial verdict would provide the solution. It would be resolution by litigation.
Second, litigation could be used strategically to pressure an extrajudicial agreement. This would be resolution by strategic litigation.
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Carter and McHerron, above n 16, at 29.
Resolution by litigation
By making these applications Ms Bartlett and the Union are effectively asking the Court to create precedent for pay equity under the Act. The Court is being asked to resolve the current dispute and create precedent for future claims to be brought. Litigation provides the solution. The Employment Court recognised it was deciding on a novel point of law.
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However, there are strong arguments against courts attempting to cater for pay equity.
One reason the courts may not be the preferred avenue for addressing pay equity is the inherent practical difficulties in addressing the highly complex issue. If the current proceedings were to continue there are three key areas that may prove challenging. These areas are finding a comparator group, establishing causation and obtaining guidance from the courts. 90 Their study showed that the size of job, relative to another, was likely to be a reflection of the particular tool used. This is a highly undesirable outcome. Justice will not be seen to be done if the result is dependent on procedural matters and not the existing discrimination.
Of course this difficulty could be overcome if a single system was adopted. In a 2009
report by the Department of Labour it appears the EJE is still favoured. 91 The Department acknowledged that a review of the tool's usability would need to be carried out. While this review did take place there was no detailed conclusion on the usability point. 92 It was acknowledged that the tool has been used infrequently at best but there was no discussion about the reasons for this.
(b) Causation
The comparator group, once found, is evidence of what men would be paid to perform the same work as the claimant. However, any differences in two groups that carry out work of equal value are not necessarily the product of gender discrimination. This is the inherent difficulty in treating unlike as like. This was not discussed in the Court of Appeal decision, but it is not necessarily an omission in a preliminary hearing. It is more likely to be considered during factual determination. However, causation will be a relevant consideration at that stage. The difference in pay must be caused by gender discrimination.
Wages in an industry are the result of a variety of factors. The value of the work alone is not determinative. Empirical evidence shows that good performance by an industry has a direct impact on wage levels. 93 High demand within an industry can also inflate wages.
Involving Pay Equity" (1986) This has been evident in the construction sector during the Christchurch rebuild.
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Furthermore, the funding structure of an industry can be of influence. In the aged-care sector, the focus of the current litigation, there is a difference in the rate of remuneration between what is paid to aged-carers carrying out their roles in public hospitals and carers carrying out the same tasks in private rest-homes receiving government subsidies. 95 These various influences demonstrate that the quantum of a wage is more than the sum total of the value of the work.
These factors impact on the rate of remuneration but in no way are attributable to gender discrimination. If causation is not required when assessing comparator groups then the claimant group is effectively being saddled with an advantages or disadvantages of the comparator industry. However, if the claim if brought under the Equal Pay Act it is clear causation must be established. The Act is limited to providing for non-discriminatory pay as defined in s 2. 96 This highlights that wages can only be corrected to the extent that discrimination is responsible.
Causation in this context is difficult to prove. The 1971 Commission of Inquiry acknowledged that, "to put the point simply, pay rates are not based solely on equal job content or on equal value of what is done." 97 In each new factual scenario, it will require a comprehensive investigation. It will be necessary to determine which part of the comparator's wage reflects the value of the work and which is the result of other factors. It is also not clear if a positive causal link is necessary. It may be enough that there is an unexplained discrepancy in rate of remuneration.
(c) Guidance
The Court of Appeal has recommended that the next step in the current proceedings is for the Employment Court to provide a statement of principles under s 9 of the Act. 98 Section 9 allows the Court to state general principles for the implementation of equal pay. 
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Equal Pay in New Zealand, above n 54, at 45.
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Equal Pay Act, s 9.
However, from the potential practical problems, arising from first trying to find a comparator and then prove causation, it appears more detailed directions may be needed. decision provided in-depth guidance on pay evaluation systems. Without a similar level of judicial direction as to the appropriate job evaluation tool procedural inconsistencies are likely to result in the New Zealand jurisdiction. Causation is such a complex investigation that parameters would be useful to limit the scope of inquiry.
While this detailed direction would undeniably be helpful in pay equity cases brought under the Act, it seems to fall outside the power given in s 9. There is a tension between the detailed direction needed and the general power given. Fitting the required detailed framework within s 9 seems to be stretching that provision beyond its capabilities. The 1975 Progress of Equal Pay in New Zealand report acknowledged the need for further guidance. 101 However, s 9 was not identified as the appropriate method of supplying these guidelines. Instead of the courts, it was seen as the purview of the government.
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While none of these practical difficulties are insurmountable, it does highlight significant practical difficulties in trying to achieve an equitable result through litigation. There is the potential for the claimant to be saddled with an onerous burden, or the courts with a cumbersome task, in identifying a comparator and causal link. It does not appear that the Court is able to mitigate these difficulties by providing an appropriate level of direction.
Furthermore, from a utilitarian perspective there is little evidence to show that litigation is able to solve the wider problem of pay equity. In no country monitored by the OECD has pay inequity been completely eliminated. of judicially prescribed pay equity are viewed in light of the expected outcome it becomes a less attractive option.
Creating a case by case approach to pay equity also has the disadvantage of increasing work load of the courts. The scope for pay equity claims in New Zealand may be wide reaching. The Chief Executive of the New Zealand Aged Care Association views pay equity as impacting the New Zealand workforce in its entirety. 106 The efficiency of engaging in a case by case system is a further detractor of resolution by litigation.
Resolution by strategic litigation
In While the pressure created by litigation may provide a solution in relation to this claim, the limits of this method must be recognised. Settlements and other agreements reached through strategic litigation do not enjoy the ability to create a precedent for future claims.
The problem of pay equity would not be conclusively solved but subdued in this scenario.
B The Market
Critics of judicial and legislative steps argue an unfettered market will correct the current disparity. 111 This argument is based on free-market ideology. Equity will be the by-product of a market free from union pressure and judicial and legislative constraints. Indeed the 1971 report from the Commission on Inquiry recommended that imposing any broad scheme should be avoided. 112 It was felt any universally applicable scheme was not desirable because of the inherent practical difficulties. Instead it was deemed that industry and the private sector was capable of making progress. 113 Realistic appraisals of job worth during employment negotiations could achieve pay equity. Those within an industry are best placed to identify and weigh the various factors that affect pay.
There are several factors that cast a doubtful shadow over these claims. First, Melvin argues that even a market free from formal constraints is still subject to the underlying biases and assumptions of society. systemic gender discrimination will be perpetuated, albeit unconsciously, by the market.
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History has shown that government intervention has been necessary to mitigate the effects of discrimination left untouched by the market. 116 Second, there have been few formal requirements placed upon the market in relation to pay equity in New Zealand. The broad power under the Equal Pay Act has not been acknowledged until the current litigation.
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Despite this prolonged period of freedom there has been no significant correction in the market. The pay gap has remained largely unchanged for over a decade. It therefore seems an unfettered market is not the appropriate avenue for pay equity. Some form of intervention is necessary.
C Legislation
A third way that equity could be provided for is with legislation. Even if equity fits within the Equal Pay Act there is arguably room for a dedicated statute that sets out more defined parameters. Government reports from 1975 and 1987 have recommended the implementation of pay equity legislation.
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For a short period of time New Zealand did have such legislation. The Employment Equity Act was enacted in 1990. The purpose of the Act was to establish procedures for achieving pay equity. 119 It created a statutory officer to oversee the implementation of pay equity and provided the machinery needed to do so. 120 Claims were to be lodged with the Commissioner for assessment. However, one of the Act's strengths was not its longevity.
Within a year it was repealed by the incoming National Government. It was repealed due to different political ideologies regarding regulation of employment.
Enacting legislation similar to this is a strong option to be considered. There are inherent advantages in dedicated legislation. In this paper I argue it is the most desirable method of providing for pay equity. It is able to address the issue with a sufficient degree of detail. The ability to establish a framework is a key reason why this path is to be preferred over a general statement by the courts under s 9. Legislation would also remove the need for interest groups to lobby and pursue strategic litigation in the future. Instead these groups and individuals would be provided with a firm foundation upon which to demand equitable payment. Legislation provides an end solution, removing the continuing uncertainty produced by market and strategic litigation methods. As well as being a highly desirable outcome, a legislative response may also be a more likely response. In the current case government interests are directly affected as a major funder of the aged care sector. There have been signals that the Government is considering taking such a step.
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V Conclusion
The issue of pay equity is far from straightforward. Pay equity claims often involve complex evidence and nuanced arguments. Two separate Government source have provided information to Insite Magazine to that effect; "Fears government will legislate over pay equity case", above n 106.
The Court of Appeal's decision has made it possible to litigate pay equity claims under the Equal Pay Act. However, proceeding with the claim for pay equity under the Act highlights wider normative questions that arise when dealing with pay equity. Resolution through litigation is impeded by practical difficulties. The general power in the Act does not give, or allow for, the required specificity of direction needed in these complex claims.
Other avenues for addressing pay equity are open. These are strategic litigation, a legislative response and an unregulated market. The most desirable path open is that of legislation. It is able to give clear, precise direction, cutting across any unconscious social biases.
Equality between genders is a protected right. It is a right the law has recognised and protected in a broad sense. 124 Pay inequity remains as a source of discriminatory disparity between genders. Pay equity deserves clear protection, best provided for in legislation.
The text of this paper excluding the bibliography, appendices, cover page, contents page and footnote citations is exactly 7999 words. 
VI Appendix One
Question 1
In determining whether there is an element of differentiation in the rate of remuneration paid to a female employee for her work, based on her sex, do the criteria identified in s 3(1)(b) of the Equal Pay Act require the Court to:
(a) Identify the rate of remuneration that would be paid if the work were not work exclusively or predominantly performed by females, by comparing the actual rate paid with a notional rate that would be paid were it not for that fact; or (b) Identify the rate that her employer would pay a male employee if it employed one to perform the work?
Answer: Section 3(1)(b) requires that equal pay for women for work predominantly or exclusively performed by women, is to be determined by reference to what men would be paid to do the same work abstracting from skills, responsibility, conditions and degrees of effort as well as from any systemic undervaluation of the work derived from current or historical or structural gender discrimination.
Question 6
In considering the s 3(1)(b) issue of "…the rate of remuneration that would be paid to male employees with the same, or substantially similar, skills, responsibility, and service, performing the work under the same, or substantially similar, conditions and with the same or substantially similar, degrees of effort", is the Authority or Court entitled to have regard to what is paid to males in other industries?
Answer: They may be if those enquiries of other employees of the same employer or of other employers in the same or similar enterprise or industry or sector would be an inappropriate comparator group.
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